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Comments
Toward a New Theory of the Fifth
Amendment Limitations on Cross-
Examination of the Accused
/Evidence, even justice itself, like gold, may be bought too dear. It is
always bought too dear, if bought at the expense ofpreponderant injus-
tice.' Jeremy Bentham
The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 2 The self-incrimination
clause has been the subject of great criticism in recent years. Many
commentators feel that the cost to society of excluding relevant, some-
times crucial, evidence outweighs the individual's need for the protec-
tions of the privilege.4 The critics of the fifth amendment privilege
consider the provision an "outmoded relic of past fears generated by
ancient inquisatorial practices that could not possibly happen here."
5
The courts have been pressured to relax the strict constitutional and
evidentiary rules protecting accuseds.6
Despite this criticism, the United States Supreme Court will proba-
bly resist demands for the overruling of the series of cases, exemplified
by Miranda v. Arizona, that have fleshed-out the constitutional man-
date. Nonetheless, other means of limiting the accused's privilege, in-
cluding a broad construction of a waiver of the privilege, though more
1. 4 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 482 (A. Hunt ed. 1827).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See generally MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959); Cross, The
Right q/Silence and the Presumption ofInnocence-Sacred Cows or Safeguards of Liberty? 1 1 J.
SoC. PUB. TCHRS. L. 66 (1969-71); Givens, Reconciling the Fifth Amendment with the Needfor
More Effective Law Enforcement, 52 A.B.A. J. 443 (1966); Hoffman, The Distortion of the Fifth
Amendment, 43 N.Y. ST. B.J. 330 (1971); Inbau, Should We Abolish the Constitutional Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?, 2 CRIM. L. REV. 28 (1955). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§X250 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
4. See, ag., Carman, A Pleafor WithdrawalofConstitutionalPrivilegefrom the Criminal, 22
MINN. L. REV. 200 (1937); Givens, supra note 3.
5. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). (Black, J., dissenting).
6. See note 3 supra.
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palatable than a complete abolition of the privilege, may be just as ef-
fective in whittling away the constitutional protection.7 For this rea-
son, courts must be careful to resist the temptation to construe broadly
the doctrine of "waivers" of constitutional rights.8 The danger of a
broad construction of a "waiver" is exemplified by the United States
Supreme Court's9 treatment of the effects of an accused's testimony on
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.10
An accused who voluntarily takes the stand and testifies in his own
behalf is deemed to have "waived" his fifth amendment privilege to
refuse to answer incriminating questions."I The breadth of his testimo-
nial "waiver" is measured by the scope of "relevant cross-examina-
tion." ' 2 The accused may be compelled to answer all questions within
the scope of relevant cross-examination although the questions asked
tend to incriminate him of the crime about which he is testifying or of
other offenses with which he might be convicted.'
3
By adopting this analysis, the Court impairs the accused's constitu-
tional right. The Court's use of the "waiver" doctrine, as applied to the
accused's privilege, does not reflect the traditional definition of a
waiver as a voluntary foregoing of a known right or privilege.14 Al-
though an accused may have the choice of whether to take the stand to
testify, the accused, because of this "choice," does not necessarily vol-
untarily undergo prosecution cross-examination. 5 The Court's vary-
ing interpretations of the scope of questioning permitted under the term
"relevant cross-examination" militate against the accused's knowledge-
able waiver of the privilege.'6 Thus, the impairment of the accused's
privilege can not rest on a "waiver" theory. Application of the
7. 340 U.S. at 376 (Black, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
9. California follows the federal approach and finds that an accused waives his state consti-
tutional privilege by testifying in his own behalf to the extent of the permissible scope of cross-
examination. Cross-examination is limited to matters about which the accused is examined on
direct. People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 611, 422 P.2d 590, 594, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1967).
10. See notes 42-59 and accompanying text infra. This comment will hereinafter refer to the
fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination as "the privilege."
11. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303,
314 (1912). The accused cannot complain of being compelled to take the stand by the force of the
government's case. This comment does not address the "waiver" of this aspect of the privilege.
12. 356 U.S. at 154-55. The term "relevant cross-examination" is used here as an amalgama-
tion of the various limits on cross-examination permitted byr the Court over the last 90 years. This
variance, discussed infra, is a major drawback of the Court s present "waiver" doctrine. See notes
83-118 and accompanying text infra.
13. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1943).
14. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 119-137 and accompanying text inra. The argument has been made that there
is no difference between the two "waivers" because the accused is aware of the results of his taking
the stand and testifying. Knowledge of a burden does not equate with a voluntary decision to
undergo that burden. See notes 122-128 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 83-111 and accompanying text infia. This will be true even though the accused
has been competently represented by counsel.
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"waiver" theory has permitted the Court to avoid confronting and bal-
ancing the competing needs of the individual and society. If limitations
on the accused's privilege when taking the stand are deemed necessary,
a fresh examination of society's justifications for impairing the ac-
cused's privilege is warranted. New limitations on the permissible
scope of cross-examination of the accused should reflect the accused's
right to exercise his privilege 7 and society's right to a fair and effective
criminal justice system.18
The purpose of this comment is to suggest that the Court's present
"waiver" doctrine masks a substantial and unjustified impairment of
the accused's privilege and that society's need for a fair and effective
criminal justice system justifies aforfeiture'9 of the accused's privilege
to refuse answering only those questions which might tend to incrimi-
nate him of the charged crime to which he has testified on direct exami-
nation. The comment will use the following analysis to achieve this
end. First, a historical background will be provided of the fifth amend-
ment privilege, the rules of cross-examination, and the accused's testi-
monial waiver. The comment will then examine the propriety of the
Court's analyzing the effects of the accused's testimony on his fifth
amendment privilege in terms of a "waiver" of a constitutional right.
This examination will suggest that the principles supporting waivers of
constitutional rights are inappropriately applied to the accused's act of
taking the stand and testifying. The accused does not make a knowl-
edgeable or voluntary waiver of the privilege when testifying to limited
matters on direct examination. Finally, the comment will demonstrate
that the accused's privilege may be impaired only by the Court's deci-
sion to enforce aforfeiture of the accused's privilege, after a balancing
of the rights of the accused and the needs of society. When the accused
is required to forfeit his privilege to refuse to answer incriminating
questions on cross-examination, in order to testify in his own behalf,
his privilege is burdened with the choice of whether to exercise the
right to testify. The impairment of the privilege may be justified by the
need of society to put the accused's testimony to the rigors of cross-
examination to assure the disclosure of the truth. All topics of cross-
examination are not, however, essential to that truth-finding process.
The comment will suggest that a forfeiture of the accused's privilege is
17. See notes 150-153 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 176-183 and accompanying text infra.
19. A forfeiture of a right is enforced by society irrespective of the party's intent to forego
that right. Ideally, the forfeiture is justified by a compelling need to require the party to forego the
right. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-44 (1970). A waiver of a right is recognized regard-
less of the presence of any justification. It rests on the subjective state of mind ofthe party. See
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976). See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 235-40 (1973).
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justified only by those questions which would incriminate him of the
crime to which he has testified. The accused should not be deemed to
have forfeited his right to assert the privilege to avoid questions incrim-
inating him of offenses to which he has not testified on direct examina-
tion to secure acquittal, although relevant to the accused's testimony.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE LIMITS OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION: BACKGROUND
While the fifth amendment does not expressly require a "waiver"
when the accused testifies, the amendment nonetheless has been instru-
mental in the development of the Court's "waiver" doctrine. Thus, re-
view of the history of the relationship between the fifth amendment and
the rules of cross-examination is crucial to an understanding of the
"waiver" concept.
A. The Ff/?h Amendment Privilege
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that
no person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.2" The privilege has been interpreted to provide greater protec-
tion than its drafters could have envisioned.2' For example, the privi-
lege has been construed to require that an accused be informed of his
right to remain silent and his right to have an attorney present during
custodial questioning before the accused may be deemed to have
waived the privlege.22 Additionally, the privilege proscribes comment
on the accused's failure to take the stand and testify.
23
One of the forces behind the expansion of the protections of the priv-
ilege has been the gradual recognition by the states and the federal
government of the accused's right to testify.24 At common law, the ac-
20. The fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
F resentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
orces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
21. The drafters of the Constitution included this privilege to protect suspects from the ex-
cesses of the English Star Chamber, the Courts of High Commission and other inquisitorial prac-
tices. See generalo, J. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §114 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Pripi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination af(America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935); see notes 165-166 and
accompanying text infra.
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
23. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965).
24. For a list of the states, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 & n.6 (1961). See
generally 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §488 (3d ed. 1940).
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cused had to rely upon the presumption that he was innocent of the
charges and leave the government to establish his guilt by its own ef-
forts.25 The accused could not be compelled to give evidence against
himself, nor was he permitted to testify in his own behalf.26 As the
states and Congress27 recognized the accused's right to testify, courts
were faced with determining whether, and to what extent, an accused's
act of taking the stand and testifying would affect his privilege to refuse
to answer incriminating questions.28 The question often was resolved
by placing restrictions on cross-examination of the accused.29 These
restrictions will next be examined.
B. Rules of Cross-Examination
The rule followed in England and approximately ten states is that
cross-examination of a witness may be directed to all subjects relevant
to any issue in the case.3" Cross-examination may extend beyond the
scope of the witness' direct testimony and is limited only by the eviden-
tiary rules governing relevancy.31
The federal courts and most state courts follow the rule that cross-
examination is limited to the subject matter of direct examination.32
This principle is codified in Rule 611 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which provides that cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of direct examination and to matters affecting the credi-
bility of the witness.33 The rule also grants the court discretion to per-
mit inquiry into additional matters, not limited to the subject matter of
direct examination, as if on direct examination.34
The federal rule has been subject to varying interpretations. Profes-
sor Morgan has said that the term "subject matter"
25. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65 (1893).
26. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971).
27. The statute reads:
In the trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses .. . the person
charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a
request shall not create any presumption against him.
20 Stat. 30 (1878), as amended 62 Stat. 833 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §3481 (1976)).
28. Many states have privileges similar to the fifth amendment. See, e.g., State v. Lurch, 12
Or. 99, 6 P. 408, 410 (1885); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) (citing cases indicating the
existence of the privilege).
29. E.g., People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 611, 422 P.2d 590, 594, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1967);
State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, 308-09, 12 P. 441, 445-47 (1886).
30. McCoRMIK, supra note 21, §21.
31. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, §21.
32. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, §21. Federal courts departed from the English rule of
"wide-open" cross-examination in Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company v. Stimpson, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840). Justice Story opined that the scope of cross-examination may include all
"facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated on direct examination. .. " of the
accused. Id. at 461.
33. FED. R. Evm. 611(b).
34. Id.
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may be interpreted to confine the inquiry to matters that would con-
tradict or cause the withdrawal of statements made on direct exami-
nation, as, for example, facts that indicated that the witness did not
personally perceive the matter to which he testified or the existence
of a fact which made that matter impossible. Or the definition may
be widened so as to permit questioning of a fact that might be di-
rectly and obviously inferred from the matter stated on direct.35
Wigmore has suggested that the scope of "subject matter" cross-exami-
nation should extend to the permissible scope of the English rule be-
cause "[t]he subject of the direct examination of the accused, properly
construed, is the whole fact of guilt or innocence.
36
The federal rule is not designed to measure the scope of the accused's
fifth amendment privilege when testifying. 37 Rather, the rule is a
mechanism through which the courts can promote the orderly presenta-
tion of the case.38 The discretion given courts to permit cross-examina-
tion outside the subject matter of direct examination may ameliorate
problems created by the varying interpretations of the scope of cross-
examination under the federal rule.39 The uncertainties of the scope of
cross-examination under the rule, however, make it an inappropriate
measure of the constitutional privilege.4 0 Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court has appropriated the federal evidentiary rule
and made it the measure of the accused's "waiver" of his fifth amend-
ment privilege.4 ' The comment will next examine the development of
the Court's waiver analysis.
C. Development of the "Waiver" Theory
Courts were not confronted with the impact of the accused's testi-
mony on the fifth amendment privilege until modem statutes recog-
nized the competency of the accused to testify at his own trial.42 For
this reason, the witness' "waiver" of the constitutional privilege devel-
oped in the context of the non-accused witness. The United States
Supreme Court summarized the rule as applied to a non-accused wit-
ness in Brown v. Walker:
43
[t]hus, if the witness himself elects to waive his privilege, as he doubt-
less may do, . . . and discloses his criminal connections, he is not
35. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 60 (4th ed. J. Weinstein
ed. 1976).
36. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 467.
37. FED. R. EvID. 611(b), 1969 Advisory Comm. Notes.
38. FED. R. EVID. 611(b), 1969 Advisory Comm. Notes.
39. See notes 113-118 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 114-118 and accompanying text infra.
41. See notes 42-59 and accompanying text infra.
42. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896).
43. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.44
As the rule developed in the federal courts, the witness did not lose his
privilege to refuse to answer incriminating questions when he took the
stand.45 The witness was deemed to have waived his privilege only by
admitting guilt or furnishing clear proof of crime.46 When the witness
had testified in an exculpatory manner, the fifth amendment privilege
remained intact and could be invoked to avoid answering questions
which could subject the witness to a reasonable danger of incrimina-
tion.47 When the witness testified in an inculpatory manner, "[a]s to
each question to which a claim of privilege [was] directed, the court
[had to] determine whether the answer to that particular question
would subject the witness to a 'real danger' of further incrimination.
48
When the Court first was faced with the effects of the accused's testi-
mony on the fifth amendment privilege, in Fitzpatrick v. United
States,49 the Court again applied a "waiver" analysis, but did not ex-
plain the rationale for adopting the waiver concept. In Fitzpatrick, the
Court found that when the accused waived his fifth amendment privi-
lege to remain silent and instead testified, 0 he also waived the right to
claim the privilege to refuse to answer incriminating questions.5 1 The
waiver of these rights subjected the accused to cross-examination on his
testimony with the "same latitude as would be exercised in the case of
an ordinary witness, as to the circumstances connecting him with the
alleged crime."'52 The Court did not intend, however, to grant the ac-
cused the right of a non-accused witness to invoke the privilege as to
questions concerning all facts or offenses to which he has not admitted
guilt, despite the Court's misleading language. The scope of John Fitz-
patrick's waiver of his privilege was much broader than that of an ordi-
nary witness.53 He was compelled to answer questions concerning the
44. Id. at 597.
45. 340 U.S. 367, 373. The rule as applied to the non-accused witness was further refined in
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). In Brown, the Court apparently extended the
"waiver" rule as applied to accuseds to all parties in civil or criminal proceedings offering volun-
tary testimony. Id. at 155. See TEx. L. Rav. 343, 346 (1959). This comment addresses only the
case of an accused. Nonetheless, to the extent that the "waiver" theory enunciated in Brown is
invalid, the balancing process suggested by this comment should also be applied to a party to a
civil action. A party to a civil action has an interest in testifying, but not always of constitutional
dimensions. Society's interests are reduced in that the government is not always a party to the
dispute. Most importantly, means of avoiding prejudice to the opposing party exist other than
requiring the party to forfeit the privilege. 356 U.S. at 160 (Black, J., dissenting).
46. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 335, 358 (1923).
47. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
48. Id.
49. 178 U.S. 304 (1900).
50. Fitzpatrick took the stand to deny a charge of murder. Id. at 315.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
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charged crime though he had testified in an exculpatory manner.54
However, the Court did not find a complete waiver of the privilege.
The Court cited two Oregon cases for the propositions that the accused
could not be compelled to furnish original evidence against himself1
5
or be compelled to answer questions calling for facts not relevant to his
direct examination. 6 Although the Court claimed that the accused as-
sumed the position of an ordinary witness by testifying, it only con-
fused matters by upholding a waiver of Fitzpatrick's privilege that
extended far beyond that of an ordinary witness.
Some of the confusion resulting from Fitzpatrick has been clarified
by subsequent cases. The Court has explained that the position of an
accused and that of an ordinary witness involuntarily on the stand are
vastly different. 7 The accused "waives" his privilege not by merely
taking the stand but by giving evidence on direct examination.5 8 The
breadth of the accused's waiver is measured by the scope of "relevant
cross-examination.
'59
In summary, the gradual recognition of the accused's right to testify
forced courts to address the effect of the accused's testimony on his fifth
amendment privilege. The United States Supreme Court resolved the
tension between the accused's privilege and the prosecution's tradi-
tional right to cross-examine witnesses by finding that the accused
"waives" his privilege by testifying. 60 This was the same method used
to limit the non-accused witness' fifth amendment privilege.6 ' The
Court finally discarded the inappropriate "waiver" theory it had used
to restrict the fifth amendment privilege of the non-accused witness in
Rogers v. United States.62 The Court realized that "[r]equiring full dis-
closures of details after a witness freely testifies as to an incriminating
fact does not rest upon a further waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. ' 63 The Fitzpatrick rule, also based on the "waiver" con-
cept, however, is still being applied.' 4 A re-examination of the
"waiver" theory as applied to the accused is, therefore, appropriate.
54. Fitzpatrick was charged with the murder of one Samuel Roberts and testified in an excul-
patory manner. 178 U.S. at 314-15. On cross-examination, the government was permitted, over
objection, to question Fitzpatrick concerning the day before the murder even though he had lim-
ited his testimony to the day of the murder. d. at 315.
55. Id. at 316, citing State v. Lurch, 12 Or. 99, 102-03, 6 P. 408, 410 (1885).
56. Id. at 316, citing State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, 308-09, 12 P. 441, 447 (1886).
57. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958).
58. See id. at 154-56.
59. Id. at 154-55.
60. See notes 49-56 and accompanying text supra.
61. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
62. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
63. Id. at 374.
64. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958).
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This comment next turns to an examination of the continued applica-
bility of the "waiver" theory.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE "WAIVER" THEORY
A decision on whether the "waiver" theory should continue to be
applied can be best made after a close investigation into the develop-
ment of the concept. This comment, therefore, will review case law to
determine what justification has been given for using the "waiver"
principle when the accused testifies. The comment will then examine
whether application of the "waiver" concept to testimony by an ac-
cused is consistent with traditional waiver analysis.
A. Foundations of the Accused's "Waiver"
Waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circum-
stances and likely consequences of the conduct supporting the waiver.
65
The United States Supreme Court has closely examined any practice or
procedure tending to diminish the protection afforded by any provision
of the Bill of Rights.66 The Court has been especially sensitive to inter-
pretations of constitutional rights that might easily support prosecution
allegations of the accused's waiver of those rights. The Court has gone
so far in this regard as to implement prophylactic rules designed to
assure that an accused's alleged waiver is both knowledgeable and not
made under compulsion.67 Waivers of constitutional rights are strictly
construed 68 and generally disfavored. Nonetheless, the Court has dras-
tically departed from this traditional waiver analysis by treating the
accused's testimony as a waiver of the privilege.69 The Court's reason
for such a far-reaching extension of the waiver theory is not clear. The
Court's earliest case dealing with the accused's testimonial waiver, Fitz-
patrick v. United States, 0 failed to provide a reason for the departure.
Although announcing a new rule of law, the Court did little to clarify
the theoretical underpinnings of the accused's waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege. The Court cited no authority when it en-
nunciated the "waiver" principle:
Where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence,
65. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
66. E.g., Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
67. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
68. See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 & n.1l (1949).
69. See notes 83-137 and accompanying text infra.
70. 178 U.S. 304 (1900).
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takes the stand in his own behalf and makes his own statement, it is
clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-examine him upon
such statement with the same latitude as would be exercised in the
case of an ordinary witness, as to the circumstances connecting him
with the crime.7 '
Rather than finding a voluntary and intentional foregoing of a known
right or privilege, the Court simply said that it knew of "no reason why
an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be
subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. '72
Since Fitzpatrick, the Court repeatedly has relied on the accused's
"waiver" to curtail the protection of the fifth amendment privilege, but
has consistently failed to examine thoroughly the applicability of
waiver principles.73 In fact, only Justice Frankfurter, in Brown v.
United States,74 has attempted to articulate the Court's reasons for
finding a waiver when the accused testifies.
Brown was a civil proceeding of denaturalization. 7 - The United
States government sought defendant Brown's denaturalization for
fraudulently procurring citizenship.76 Brown testified at the denaturali-
zation proceeding that she had truthfully sworn, at the time she pro-
cured her citizenship in 1946, to not having been a member of the
Communist party." She was later held in contempt for refusing to an-
swer questions relating to her activities after 1946.78 Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the Court, held that Brown had waived her privilege
by testifying as she did.7 9 The Court thereby extended the rule, for-
merly applied only to accuseds, 80 to defendant Brown's testimony. Jus-
tice Frankfurter justified the extension of the rule by pointing out the
three reasons that he claimed supported finding a waiver by any party
who testifies in a criminal or civil proceeding: (1) the ability of the
accused, and any witness who voluntarily takes the stand, to determine
"the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry"; (2) the accused's abil-
ity to choose, after weighing the advantage of the privilege against the
advantage of putting forward his version of the facts and his reliability
as a witness, not to testify; (3) and the interests of the other party and
71. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1920); Powers v. United States, 223
U.S. 303, 315 (1912).
74. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
75. Id. at 149. See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913).
76. 356 U.S. at 149.
77. Id. at 150.
78. Id. at 152.
79. Id. at 154-55.
80. See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
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regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth."1
The accused's ability to define the scope of cross-examination by lim-
iting his testimony on direct examination supports the Court's claim
that the accused is able to waive the fifth amendment privilege with a
sufficient awareness of the likely consequences of the waiver. The ac-
cused's choice to testify, with knowledge that he will undergo cross-
examination subject to a waiver of the privilege, supports the Court's
claim that the accused voluntarily waives the privilege. In the abstract,
the Court's reasoning 2 fully supports the finding of an intentional and
voluntary foregoing of a known right or privilege. This "waiver", how-
ever, as applied to the accused, is not voluntary or knowing. Both as-
sumptions made by the Court, voluntariness and knowledge, are
fundamentally unsound. A thorough examination of the foundation of
the accused's waiver is necessary to assure that abstract principles do
not result in the broad construction of a "waiver" of the accused's fifth
amendment privilege.
B. A Knowing Waiver?
The rationale of a waiver of constitutional rights suited the Court's
use of the evidentiary rules of cross-examination to measure the
breadth of the accused's waiver of the privilege. The accused suppos-
edly is able to determine the scope of cross-examination by limiting his
direct examination. 3 The court has failed, however, to apply consist-
ently the federal rule of cross-examination as the measure of the ac-
cused's waiver.8 4 Some of the Court's opinions have approved cross-
examination of the accused outside the subject matter of his direct ex-
amination. 5 Moreover, the federal rule of cross-examination, even if
consistently applied, is a difficult standard for a court to apply and is an
arbitrary measure.86 These factors militate against a knowing waiver
of the privilege and illustrate the inappropriateness of the Court's
waiver theory.
The Court's definition of "relevant cross-examination" has varied
over the years.8 7 The Court's most recent case, Brown v. United
81. 356 U.S. at 155-56.
82. The final considerations set out in Brown, the interest of the other party and regard for
the function of the court to ascertain the truth, do not affect the voluntariness of the accused's
waiver or the ability to knowingly waive the right. While these are relevant considerations, and
must form the basis of any impairment of the accused's privilege required by his voluntary testi-
mony, they do not support a waiver of a constitutional right.
83. Id. at 155.
84. See notes 87-111 and accompanying text infra.
85. See notes 93-111 and accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 112-118 and accompanying text infra.
87. At one time, the accused's waiver was thought to be complete. Raffel v. United States,
271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926). The proper scope of cross-examination was, therefore, merely an evi-
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States,"8 tends to support the application of the federal "subject mat-
ter" rule of cross-examination. 9 The Court's opinion suggests that ap-
plication of the federal rule of cross-examination is the proper measure
of the accused's waiver. Justice Frankfurter emphasized the ability of
the accused and any witness who voluntarily takes the stand, especially
a party to the proceeding, to determine the area of disclosure and there-
fore of inquiry.9" Arguably, an accused can determine the area of in-
quiry only under the federal rule governing the scope of cross-
examination 9' since the federal rule restricts cross-examination of a
witness to the subject matter of that witness' direct examination.92 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has sanctioned cross-examina-
tion of the accused outside the scope of direct examination.
In Powers v. United States,93 defendant Powers was charged with
having in his possession an unregistered still and distilling apparatus
for the production of spiritous liquors.94 Powers testified at his prelimi-
nary hearing that he had been hired to beat apples by one Preston Pow-
ers on the date alleged, but that he had no interest in the apples or their
product. 95 On cross-examination, Powers was compelled to answer
questions concerning his work at a distillery within two years of the
date of the warrant.96 The defendant's statement that he had worked at
a distillery the previous fall was later introduced at his trial.97 The
Court upheld Powers' conviction, finding that he had waived his consti-
tutional privilege. 98 Since he took the stand and offered testimony
tending to prove his innocence, he was required to submit to cross-
examination concerning any matter pertinent to the examination in
chief.99 The questions did not exceed the proper limits of cross-exami-
nation, in the Court's opinion, because they tended to show that the
defendant "knew the character of the occupation at the time
charged."'" The Powers Court thereby sanctioned cross-examination
dentiary consideration and was left to the individual states. See id. In Powers v. United States,
223 U.S. 303 (1912), cross-examination was permitted to any matter pertinent to the examination
in chief. Id. at 315. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text infra.
88. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
89. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
90. 356 U.S. at 155.
91. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
92. For a similar argument, see Carlson, Cross-ExamInation of the Accused, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 705, 716 (1966-67).
93. 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
94. Id. at 310.
95. Id. at 311.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 314.
99. Id. at 315.
100. Id. at 316.
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of Powers that arguably was well outside the subject matter of his direct
examination.
The Court's opinion in Johnson v. United States,01 moreover, sup-
ports the application of the English "wide-open" rule of cross-examina-
tion."I In Johnson, the defendant was indicted for income tax evasion
for the years 1935, 1936, and 1937 for not reporting large sums of
money received from the "syndicate."' 103 On direct examination, the
defendant, while testifying, admitted that he had received the sums of
money up to November 1937, accounted for the absence of the sums in
his income tax reports, and denied having received any money from the
"syndicate" during November or December of 1937.104 The govern-
ment asked the defendant whether he had received the payments in
1938.105 The trial court upheld the defendant's assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege but allowed the government to comment on the
defendant's assertion of the privilege.106 The Court found that the:
[i]nquiry into [defendant's] income for 1938 was relevant to the issue
in the case. As contended by the prosecution, the receipt of money
from the numbers syndicate prior to November, 1937 and after De-
cember, 1937 might well support a finding of the jury that in view of
all the circumstances the payments were not in fact interrupted dur-
ing the last two months of 1937 .... That line of inquiry therefore
satisfied the test of relevancy and was a proper part of cross-
examination. '
0 7
The opinion cited Wigmore for the proposition that the accused's "vol-
untary offer of testimony upon anyfact is a waiver as to all other rele-
vant facts, because of the necessary connection between them all.' 0 8
Wigmore has been a proponent of the English rule of cross-examina-
tion, even as applied to the accused. 10 9
Federal intermediate appellate courts have usually followed the fed-
eral "subject matter" rule of cross-examination.' 10 Nonetheless, a
number of courts, drawing on the language in Johnson, have author-
101. 318 U.S. at 189.
102. See notes 30, 31 and accompanying text infra.
103. 318 U.S. at 190.
104. Id. at 191.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 192-93.
107. Id. at 195-96.
108. Id. at 195 (emphasis added for "any fact").
109. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 459-62. The effect of the rule proposed by Wig-
more is,
[t]hat the accused, as to all facts whatever (except those which merely impeach his credit
and therefore are not directly related to the charge in issue) has signified his waiver by
the initial act of taking the stand.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 459-62.
110. See Carlson, Cross-Examination oftheAccused, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 705, 712 & n.20 (1966-
67); Note, The Scope of Cross-Examination, 24 IowA L. REv. 584, 568 (1939).
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ized cross-examination that has gone beyond the subject matter of the
accused's direct examination.11' The significance of the divergence of
opinions lies not in its suggestion of a need for an authoritative state-
ment by the Court, but in its effect on the accused's ability to predict
the scope of his fifth amendment waiver, thereby suggesting that the
waiver theory is inappropriate.
In summary, the Court appears to have sanctioned the application of
conflicting rules of cross-examination of the accused. The Court has at
various times approved the application of the federal "subject matter"
rule, and English "wide-open" rule of cross-examination, and cross-
examination that concerns any matter "pertinent to the examination in
chief' though arguably outside the subject matter of direct examina-
tion. The intermediate appellate courts have demonstrated a similar
diversity of rules of cross-examination.
The federal "subject matter" rule of cross-examination, if universally
adopted and applied by the courts, as suggested in Brown v. United
States,"2 would give the accused scant help in determining the scope
of the waiver of his privilege to be enforced by the courts. The princi-
pal merit of the "subject matter" rule of cross-examination is its ten-
dency to promote the orderly presentation of the case. 13 Despite this
advantage, critics have claimed that the restrictive rule is
productive in the courtroom of bickering over the choice of the nu-
merous variations of the "scope of the direct" criterion, and of their
application to particular cross-questions. Observance of these vague
and ambiguous restrictions is a matter of constant ... concern to the
cross-examiner.' 14
As a rule of evidence, these problems may not be significant." 5 But as
a measure of a constitutional privilege, they become critical. The scope
111. Eg., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. Branmon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1246 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dana, 457 F.2d 205, 210 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 334-35 (3d. Cir. 1970)
(dicta), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); United States v. Dillon, 436 F.2d 1093, 1096 (5th Cir.
1971); Nash v. United States, 405 F.2d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 1969); Bolling v. United States, 18 F.2d
863, 865 (4th Cir. 1927).
112. 356 U.S. 148 (1958). This assumes that the measure of the accused's waiver is of constitu-
tional origins. There is some doubt, however, as to the validity of this assumption. The Court's
most recent examination of the effects of the accused's testimony on the fifth amendment privilege
occurred in 1958, six years before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), extended the fifth amend-
ment protection to accuseds on trial in state courts. Commentators are divided on the question.
Compare Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 705, 716 (1966-67); 45
N.C. L. REv. 1030-32 (1967); 37 TEx. L. REV. 343, 344 (1970) with Sobel, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination "Federalized", 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 42 (1964); Note, Procedural Protections
of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit
Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426, 433-34 (1964); 41 Mo. L. REV. 114, 118 (1976).
113. FED. R. EVID. 611, 1969 Advisory Comm. Notes.
114. Id., quoting MCCoRMICK, supra note 21, §27, at 55.
115. The other party may always introduce evidence during his case-in-chief or in rebuttal.
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of a constitutional right should not be measured by a rule that is sus-
ceptible of varying interpretation by the courts and the subject of argu-
ment after the right is deemed to have been waived. Under these
conditions, the privilege becomes a trap for the unwary rather than a
safeguard for the innocent.'
1 6
The Federal Rules of Evidence attempted to ameliorate the eviden-
tiary drawbacks of the restrictive rule by granting the court discretion
to permit inquiry into additional matters, not limited to the subject
matter of direct examination, as if on direct examination." 7 While this
may solve any evidentiary problems faced by a witness not threatened
with questions requiring incriminating responses, it would merely com-
pound the dilemma of a witness attempting to determine the scope of
his constitutional right. The grant of discretion to the court to permit
cross-examination outside the subject matter of the witness' direct ex-
amination would only place the accused, faced with waiving his privi-
lege by testifying, in the difficult position of having to guess the
predilections of the particular judge he finds himself before. Both the
vagueness of the "subject matter" rule and its grant of discretion to the
court detract from the propriety of using the evidentiary rule of cross-
examination to measure the accused's constitutional privilege. As the
commentators to the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized "[in all
events, the extent of the waiver of the accused's privilege against self-
incrimination ought not to be determined as a by-product of a rule of
cross-examination." "18
In summary, the Court has sanctioned varying limitations of the
proper scope of cross-examination of an accused. The resulting confu-
sion, reflected in the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts, de-
tracts from the accused's ability to predict the scope of cross-
examination to which he will be subjected. Moreover, the Court can-
not alleviate the danger by definitively sanctioning the application of
the "subject matter" rule of cross-examination. The "subject matter"
rule suffers from the drawbacks of vagueness and varying interpreta-
tions. As a result, the inability of the accused to ascertain the breadth
of his waiver detracts from the Court's claim that the accused's waiver
is made with sufficient knowledge of its effects.
This section of the comment has demonstrated that serious questions
exist concerning the ability of the accused to make a knowing waiver of
the privilege. Because this problem could be solved by a clearer defini-
116. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
117. FED. R. EVID. 611(b), 1969 Advisory Comm. Notes.
118. Id. See McCoRMICK, supra note 21, §132, at 279-80.
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tion of the proper scope of cross-examination, the inquiry must turn
next to the question of the voluntariness of the "waiver."
C A Voluntary Waiver?
A waiver involves a voluntary foregoing of a known right or privi-
lege.' 19 In Brown v. United States,12 0 the Court supported its claim that
an accused's "waiver" of the fifth amendment privilege is voluntary by
emphasizing the ability of the accused to refrain from taking the stand
in his own behalf.'l2  Though the accused may have a "choice" of
whether to remain silent or take the stand, it is submitted that the
choice to "waive" the privilege on cross-examination is not voluntary.
In Brown, the Court apparently confused the accused's decision to
take the stand, coupled with knowledge of the Court's doctrine requir-
ing his waiver of the privilege, with the accused's voluntary and inten-
tional decision to subject himself to prosecution cross-examination by
testifying.122 The accused's assumption of the role of a witness is not
inconsistent with a retention of the privilege. The accused's ability to
choose between taking the stand and remaining silent was never meant
to be the talisman of all fifth amendment privilege considerations.
23
"[Tlhe rule that the privilege is waived by taking the stand developed
in criminal cases as an historical corollary of the fact that the accused
could not even be called or sworn as a witness,"' 24 not as a result of the
dictates of the language or history of the fifth amendment. The protec-
tions of the privilege are not limited to preventing the accused from
being called to the stand by the prosecution at his criminal trial.12  The
accused could, in theory, take the stand, testify in his own behalf, and
yet be free from all prosecution cross-examination. 126 The Court there-
fore begs the question when claiming that an accused voluntarily
waives the privilege by testifying to limited issues, because the accused
is expected to know of the Court's present view requiring the accused to
119. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
120. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
121. See id. at 155.
122. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393 (1968). But see McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 212 (1971).
123. The accused was not competent to take the stand at the time the fifth amendment was
drafted. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
124. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 162 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting) citing 8 WiO-
MoRE, EVIDENCE §2268 (3d ed. 1940).
125. For example, even if the accused did not take the stand, the fifth amendment privilege
was threatened by the ability of the prosecution to comment on the accused's silence. This impair-
ment of the privilege was not totally remedied by the Court until Griffin . Calforna, 380 U.S. 609,
615 (1965).
126. Wigmore suggests that this is the English rule. WIaMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 469.
See Regina v. Garbett, 175 Eng. Rep. 
196, 204 (1847).
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forego his privilege by taking the stand. 12 7 "[W]aiver through testi-
mony is a fiction-the witness is held to have waived his right for rea-
sons which often have little to do with his subjective desire."'
' 28
Although the decision to take the stand and subject himself to cross-
examination may, as an abstract principle, be voluntary, the accused is
forced to undergo cross-examination for reasons other than the courts'
recognition of the accused's voluntary choice.'
29
An extension of this waiver theory would permit the Court to condi-
tion the accused's ability to assert various statutory and constitutional
rights on the accused's decision to exercise a preliminary option, by
claiming that the accused's "preliminary decision" acts as a "waiver" of
the other statutory and constitutional rights. The Court generally has
avoided this type of analysis.1 30 For example, in McGautha v. Califor-
nia,'3' the Court addressed the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that
provided a unitary proceeding to determine the guilt and penalty
phases of an accused's trial.132 The statute was attacked on fifth
amendment grounds because it created a burden on the accused's fifth
amendment privilege by exerting considerable force to compel the ac-
cused to waive the privilege and take the stand in order to testify at the
penalty phase of the trial. 133 The Court could have found that the right
to testify to penalty necessarily includes the duty to testify to guilt and
that the accused waives any impairment of the privilege created by the
statute when he chooses to take the stand. The Court eschewed this
opportunity to find a broad "waiver" of the privilege and rather used
an analysis that initially required an examination of whether compel-
ling the election between the privilege and the right to testify impairs to
any appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights. 134 This
test required an examination of the policies of the privilege, 35 not just
the imposition of a state of mind on the accused.
Whether the accused should retain the privilege when he takes the
stand and testifies must be distinguished from the effect to be given
conduct by the accused indicating his intent to forego the exercise of a
127. See Jenkins v. United States, 447 U.S. 231, 251 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Comment, Waiver of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 14 STAN. L. REv. 811, 812-
13 (1961).
129. See 390 U.S. at 393-94. But see 402 U.S. at 212.
130. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493, 498 (1967); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1972) (the Court necessarily
rejected the dissent's arguments that even if the defendant did take the stand, the choice was
burdened only by the weight of the prosecution's evidence).
131. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
132. Id. at 191-92.
133. See 406 U.S. at 615 (Burger, J., dissenting).
134. 402 U.S. at 213.
135. See notes 81, 82 and accompanying text supra.
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right. The first question requires an analysis of the policies of the privi-
lege and the interests of the accused in exercising his privilege unfet-
tered by external pressure. 36 Avoiding this analysis, by finding a
voluntary choice, can result in an impairment of the privilege.
When rights are deemed waived through ... attribution to conduct
of assertive significance it will not reasonably bear, . . . the rules of
criminal procedure have lost most of their meaning. To be sure, it
may prove impossible for courts to determine whether a surrender of
rights is truly 'voluntary.
' 137
If the accused is compelled, by threat of contempt or perjury, to answer
incriminating questions on cross-examination, the accused's answers
are certainly not voluntary.
In summary, the United States Supreme Court's opinions initially
failed to provide a reasoned analysis of the propriety of the use of
waiver principles to describe the effects of the accused's testimony on
his fifth amendment privilege. 38 The most recent Court opinion, how-
ever, has attempted to force the accused's act of testifying into the
traditional requirements of a waiver of a constitutional right. 39 In
truth, the accused's act of testifying does not comport with the tradi-
tional strict requirements of a waiver of a constitutional privilege.
1 40
The accused takes the stand to testify unaware of the likely conse-
quences of his testimonial "waiver." The Court's inconsistent applica-
tion of the federal rule of cross-examination as a measure of the
breadth of the accused's waiver,1 41 and the inherent deficiencies of the
federal "subject matter" rule of cross-examination 42 militate against
the foregoing of a known right or privilege. The accused does not nor-
mally take the stand intending to subject himself voluntarily to un-
tramelled prosecution cross-examination requiring incriminating
responses.143
The government may have interests which justify requiring the ac-
cused tofofeit certain protections of the privilege should he take the
stand and testify. The impairment of the privilege can not rest, how-
ever, on a "waiver" of the privilege. Interpreting the accused's testi-
mony as a "waiver" of his constitutional privilege allows the Court to
136. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More CarefulAnayss, 55 TEx. L.
REv. 193, 196 (1977). See notes 81, 82 and accompanying text supra.
137. Tigar, Foreward" Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 25 (1970).
138. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 74-82 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 87-111 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 112-118 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 123-137 and accompanying text supra.
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avoid examining the delicate balance between the government's inter-
ests in requiring the accused to forego his privilege and the accused's
interest in an unimpaired fifth amendment privilege. If the accused is
to be subject to cross-examination because of his testimony, the invol-
untary impairment of the accused's privilege must rest on the Court's
willingness to enforce aforfeiture of the privilege. The forfeiture analy-
sis, discussed in the next section of the comment, represents a new ap-
proach and will suggest new limitations on the constitutional scope of
cross-examination of the accused.
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AN ACCUSED
The accused has the constitutional right to testify in his own behalf
at his criminal trial and to claim the protections of the fifth amendment
privilege to government questioning that might tend to incriminate
him. The Court's present "waiver" theory,14 which may in some cases
require the accused to forfeit this aspect of the fifth amendment privi-
lege when taking the stand and testifying, burdens the accused's fifth
amendment privilege with a choice of whether to testify to his inno-
cence and compells the accused to choose between the exercise of these
two rights. 45 This coerced choice impairs to an appreciable extent the
policies behind the fifth amendment privilege.
146
This impairment of the accused's privilege must be balanced against
the need of society to compel the forfeiture of the right to assure an
effective and just criminal justice system. 47 A complete forfeiture of
the accused's privilege is not necessitated by the function of the courts
of justice to ascertain the truth. New limitations on the scope of the
accused's cross-examination must be developed that reflect the ac-
cused's right to exercise his privilege and the need of society to ascer-
tain the truth.
4. Forfeitures of Constitutional Rights
Constitutional rights do not exist in a vacuum. Their exercise is
often accomplished only at great cost to the interests of society.
48
Courts have not permitted individual rights to be exercised in deroga-
tion of society's interests and have sought to balance the competing
interests to seek equitable results. 49 When the interests of society pre-
144. See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 150-153 and accompanying text infra.
146. See notes 154-173 and accompanying text infra.
147. See notes 176-183 and accompanying text infra.
148. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
149. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-84 (1970). See generaly Brennan, The Criminal
Prosecutiox Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?. 1963 WAsH. U. L. Q. 279.
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vail over the individual's constitutional right, society is justified in re-
quiring the partial or complete forfeiture of the right. Similarly, the
proper measure of the accused's fifth amendment privilege requires a
balancing of the accused's interest in exercising his privilege free from
prosecution cross-examination against the need of society to compel the
accused's forfeiture in order to arrive at the truth in its courts of justice.
An accused has a constitutional right to address the factfinder on the
issue of his guilt.'5 ' By requiring that an accused forfeit his privilege in
order to exercise the right to testify, the State can burden the accused's
fifth amendment privilege by forcing him to choose whether to
testify.
151
The burden which is placed on the privilege is not a necessary ele-
ment of a criminal justice system. The accused could, in theory, take
the stand, testify in his own behalf, and yet be free from all prosecution
cross-examination. 1
52
Notwithstanding the theoretical considerations,
[t]he criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with
situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which
course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even of
constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that same token always forbid requiring
him to choose. 153
The threshold question, as enunciated in McGautha v. California,154 is
whether compelling the election "impairs to an appreciable extent any
of the policies behind the rights involved."' 55
In McGautha, Crampton had been sentenced to death under a trial
scheme that provided a single proceeding for the guilt and penalty
phases of the accused's trial.'56 Crampton claimed that the scheme vio-
150. Some constitutional right has impliedly been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court. The question was left open in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Justice Clark, in
his concurring opinion to Ferguson, found the right to be guaranteed by due process requirements.
Id. at 602. The Court suggested the possibility of a constitutional basis for the right in United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion to Grayson, found the
right guaranteed by the sixth amendment right to counsel as interpreted in Faretta v. Calfornia,
422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 438 U.S. at 56 n.2. See generally Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1075-
77 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1980); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emerging Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713 (1975). See also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
151. For a similar analysis, see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) and Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1972).
152. Wigmore suggests that this is the English rule. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 469.
153. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
154. Id.
155. Id. See generally Berger, Burdening the Fifth Amendment: Toward a Presumptive BarrierTheory, 70 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 27(1979).
156. See 402 U.S. at 191-92. Crampton's case was reviewed with that of McGautha.
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lated his fifth amendment privilege.' 57 The Court found that the ten-
sion between the accused's fifth amendment privilege and the accused's
right to testify during the penalty phase of his trial did not appreciably
impair any of the policies or history of the two rights. 58 The same
result is not, however, compelled in the case of an accused who is
forced to forefeit his fifth amendment privilege from compelled incrimi-
nation to testify at the guilt phase of his trial.
The fifth amendment privilege does not, of itself, require that the
accused forfeit his privilege in order to testify. The intent of the draft-
ers of the Constitution can not readily be gleaned from practices ex-
isting in Colonial America. The accused was, at the drafting of the
amendment, incompetent to testify in his own behalf at his criminal
trial.159 The absence of the tension between the accused's privilege and
his right to testify at the time of the drafting of the amendment does not
support the conclusion that the privilege was obviously not intended to
protect an accused who voluntarily takes the stand. 160 The Constitu-
tion is not frozen in time and must adapt to changes in the proceedings
of the nation's courts.
16 1
Similarly, the Anglo-American judicial system, champion of the use
of cross-examination, 62 does not require that every party or witness
testifying before the finder of fact forfeit the privilege to refrain from
answering incriminating questions on cross-examination. An ordinary
witness traditionally retained the privilege even though a party to the
lawsuit. 163 The accused has always been able to place his case before
the finder of fact through witnesses or physical evidence without being
subjected to cross-examination. The policies behind the privilege, and
not the language of the privilege or its historical setting, must dictate
whether to extend its protections to an accused who voluntarily takes
the stand and testifies in his own behalf.
The privilege against self-incrimination reflects many of the policies
of our judicial system: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel "trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
157. Id. at 208-09.
158. Id. at 214-15.
159. See notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra.
160. This claim was made in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971).
161. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
162. 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §1367, at 32-33 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1974).
163. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra. In England, at one time, the accused re-
tained the full protection of the privilege and could refrain from answering questions at any point
in his testimony. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 469. Many states at one time permitted the
accused to make an unsworn statement to the jury without undergoing cross-examination. See
generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582-87 (1961) (dictum).
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criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elic-
ited by inhumane treatment and abuses; and our sense of fair play re-
quiring that the government shoulder the entire responsibility for
proving the accused's guilt. 164
Requiring a forfeiture of the accused's privilege when taking the
stand to testify subjects the accused to the trilemma of having to choose
between self-incrimination, perjury, and contempt. One of the evils
sought to be eradicated by the fifth amendment privilege was the "ex
officio oath" as used by the English Courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission.16' The suspect was involuntarily placed under oath by
government agents and then had to choose between self-incrimination,
contempt for refusing to testify, and perjury. 66 This policy for the en-
forcement of the protections of the privilege has generally been thought
to be inapplicable to the witness, particularly the accused, in modem
courts.' 67 The fifth amendment grants the accused the right to refrain
from testifying and proscribes comment on the accused's decision to
refrain from testifying.' 68 Arguably, the accused is not compelled to
undergo the trilemma since he has the option of not taking the stand.
This argument, however, overlooks the intense pressure on the accused
to take the stand.
Modem commentators have emphasized the cost to the accused of
not testifying.'69 Accuseds foregoing their right to testify face signifi-
cantly greater chances of conviction even though their failure to take
the stand may not be commented on by the prosecution. 170 The ac-
cused is forced, by the increased chances of conviction if he fails to
testify, to choose between harmful disclosures brought about by the
forfeiture of his privilege, contempt, and perjury. This is not to say that
the mere force of the government's case is compelling the accused to
164. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). For a more complete list of
the various policies that have been suggested as rationales of the privilege, see WIOMORE, supranote 3, §2276.
Concededly, the policy of the privilege protecting accuseds from inhumane treatment and abuse
is not impaired by requiring the accused to forfeit his privilege in order to testify. The accused is
under the protection of the court when he takes the stand.
165. See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incriml.
nation in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 770-71, 783-87 (1935).
166. Pittman, supra note 165, at 770-71, 783-87.
167. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 462.
168. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
169. Nunnelley, Practical Trial Techniques, in CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICES §13.28
(1978); TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 390; Williams, The Trial of a
Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 36, 42 (1957); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal
Defendant-,4 Reevaluation ofthe Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evi-
dence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 426, 433 (1970).
170. See note 169 supra. See generally To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand" The
Dilemma of the Defendant With a CriinalRecord, 4 COLUM. i.L. Soc. PROB. 215, 220-26 (1968).
See also A. TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 209-12 (1923).
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forfeit his right. 1 ' If the government is justified in requiring the forfei-
ture of the accused's privilege when testifying, the government does not
burden the accused's choice to either remain silent or testify subject to a
"waiver" of his privilege by the mere force of its case. But this analysis
assumes that the government is justified in requiring the "waiver." Un-
til the Court justifies its enforcement of a forfeiture of the privilege, the
"natural pressure" on the accused to testify, created by the force of the
prosecution's case, is important only in its effect on the incidence of
accuseds forced to forfeit the privilege, not its effect on the very exist-
ence of an unjustified impairment of the constitutional right.
The accused's exculpatory direct testimony does not make his invol-
untary incriminating statements produced on cross-examination any
less offensive to a judicial system that requires an accusatory rather
than an inquisitory method of proving an accused's guilt. 72 Requiring
the accused to forfeit his privilege in order to testify provides the prose-
cution with an opportunity to "fill-out" a weak case and encourages the
prosecution of otherwise frivolous cases. A skillful prosecutor can use
cross-examination as a powerful tool to shape the testimony of a ner-
vous and bewildered accused. 173 The accused can be made to provide
missing elements of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The accused runs
the risk, when testifying, of supplying vital and incriminating evidence
when questioned on cross-examination.
Requiring the accused to forfeit the fifth amendment privilege in or-
der to testify free of cross-examination does impair, to an appreciable
extent, the policies behind the fifth amendment privilege. The exist-
ence of this impairment does not, however, necessitate the complete re-
tention by the accused of the fifth amendment privilege. A
determination that the tension between the rights appreciably impairs
the policies of the rights involved does not end the analysis set forth in
McGautha.174 The impairment of constitutional rights must be bal-
anced against the need of society to compel an election between the
rights.'7 1 Only when the need of society to compel an election between
the rights outweighs the need of the individual to exercise both rights
free of any impairment is a forfeiture of one or both of the rights justi-
fied and constitutional.
171. This argument has properly been rejected by the Court. See Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970).
172. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). See WIGMORE, supra note 3, §2276, at 318-19.
173. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
174. See notes 154-158 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 148, 149 supra. See generally Wessen, Away From Waiver: A Rationalefor the
Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MiCH. L. REv. 1214, 1238 (1976-77).
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B. Balancing Competing Interests
The ascertainment of truth is a fundamental goal of our legal sys-
tem.176 When an accused takes the stand, the proper functioning of the
adversary system requires that the government be permitted proper and
effective cross-examination to elicit the truth. 177 A main concern of
commentators opposed to the fifth amendment privilege is that it acts
as a shield for wholesale acts of perjury. 78 The critics fear that permit-
ting an accused to take the stand, to testify in his own behalf and then
to avoid prosecution cross-examination would invite perjury.' 79 Full
retention of the privilege also would allow the accused to distort the
picture of the case presented to the factfnder and would hamper the
search for truth.1
8 0
These fears are justified. Cross-examination has been termed "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth."'"'
Although this claim may be exaggerated, 8 2 cross-examination does
provide an important means of testing a witness' bias, interest in the
proceeding, perception, memory, and credibility. 8 3 Permitting the ac-
cused to escape cross-examination may provide an incentive to commit
perjury and remove the accused's testimony from the searching and
probing examination of the finder of fact.
Society's compelling need to subject the accused's testimony to cross-
examination must, however, be balanced against the individual's right
to testify without having to forfeit the fifth amendment privilege. This
balance can best be weighed by examining the reduction in the ac-
cused's ability to prove his innocence brought about by the forfeiture of
his privilege.
Guilty and innocent accuseds are guaranteed the right to have the
government shoulder the entire burden of proving their guilt by re-
fraining from taking the stand.'84 They are also able to present evi-
dence of their innocence through witnesses.8 5 Finally, every accused is
privileged to testify in his own defense.
1 6
Forfeiture of the accused's privilege does not affect the accused's
176. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).
177. Id. at 626-27.
178. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958).
179. Id.
180. Id. See generally Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incriminaion, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1763-68 (1978-79).
181. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367 (3d ed. 1940).
182. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 21, §31.
183. See McCoRMICK, supra note 21, §245.
184. See 356 U.S. at 155.
185. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
186. See Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
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ability to remain silent or present physical evidence. Forfeiture of the
accused's privilege does, however, deter testimony by the accused.
Nonetheless, the deterrence does not, in all circumstances, violate the
principles of the privilege.'87 "Every criminal defendant is privileged
to testify in his own behalf or to refuse to do so. But [the privilege to
testify] cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.'
' 88
Those accuseds who are guilty and willing to perjure themselves by
testifying in an exculpatory manner must be satisfied with their right to
remain silent or present other witnesses and evidence. They should not
be permitted to rely on an opportunity to mislead the jury with their
perjurious testimony free from the adversarial test of of cross-examina-
tion. 189 Those accuseds innocent of the crimes charged may take the
stand secure that the veracity of their exculpatory testimony will be
upheld on cross-examination. Only those accuseds innocent of the
crime charged but susceptible to over-bearing cross-examination need
fear the force of prosecution questioning. The number of accuseds
fitting this description is hopefully small and does not warrant the right
of all accuseds to escape cross-examination. In the balance, society's
interest in conducting general cross-examination of all accuseds out-
weighs the interests of those accuseds who might be deterred from
truthfully testifying to their innocence by the threat of cross-examina-
tion, and a forfeiture of the accused's privilege on cross-examination is
justified.
This analysis does not necessarily require forfeiture of the privilege
to prosecution cross-examination on all topics. Some areas of cross-
examination are not essential to the function of the courts to ascertain
the truth and represent a substantial impairment of an accused's right
to testify consonant with the principles of the fifth amendment privi-
lege. A second level of analysis is required to determine the scope of
the accused's forfeiture of the privilege. Different topics of cross-exam-
ination may require independent weighing of the competing interests.
Courts permit questioning of the accused that requires incriminating
responses to offenses other than those to which the accused is charged
and has testified. 90 Questions directed to facts supporting prosecution
of unresolved offenses to which the accused is not testifying on direct
examination have been found to be within the scope of permissible
cross-examination of the accused.' 91 Requiring the accused to forfeit
187. See notes 159-164 and accompanying text supra.
188. 401 U.S. at 225.
189. Id.
190. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195 (1943).
191. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303
(1912); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 520 (1979).
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his privilege to avoid answering questions of this type will not substan-
tially further the need of society to foster the discovery of the truth' 92
but instead will impair the accused's free exercise of the fifth amend-
ment privilege.
193
The accused's ability to claim the privilege on cross-examination of
other offenses will not greatly impact society's interest in discovering
the truth concerning the crime to which the accused testifies. The ac-
cused's ability to avoid questioning of other offenses or to introduce
false evidence of his innocence of other offenses does not greatly distort
the factfinder's picture of the accused's guilt of the charged crime to
which he has testified to seek acquittal. The relevancy of evidence of
other offenses is tangential at best: the finder of fact is first asked to
find that the accused has commited another crime and then asked to
use an aspect of that crime to infer guilt in the case to which the ac-
cused is charged. Although the greatest relevancy of this type of evi-
dence is its use to prove a propensity to commit the charged crime, this
use of the evidence is strictly prohibited.'9 4 The accused will, more-
over, still be required to answer all questions directed to the crime to
which he has testified. Prior convictions may be used to impeach the
accused 195 or to show evidence of a common scheme or plan or the
accused's intent.' 96 Moreover, retaining the privilege as to questions
directed to offenses to which the accused has not testified will not en-
courage perjury because few accuseds will risk the force of prosecution
cross-examination if guilty of the charged crime merely to perjure
themselves solely on these areas of testimony.
The accused's privilege is greatly compromised by requiring the ac-
cused to submit to cross-examination, under threat of perjury or con-
tempt, directed to offenses to which the accused has not testified.
Responses to this type of cross-examination can be used in future pros-
ecutions and may provide a substantial basis for securing convictions.
Moreover, all accuseds can be threatened by future prosecutions, not
just those innocent of the crime to which they have testified. Accuseds
guilty of the crime with which they are charged and to which they have
testified do not offend the principles of the privilege by claiming the
privilege to questions directed at other offenses. 197 This comment sug-
192. See notes 176-183 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 164-171 and accompanying text supra.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See generally Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal
Defendant-A Reevaluation ofthe Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Eyl-
dence ofPropensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1970). Extrinsic evidence may often
be used to prove the accused's conduct without violating the fifth amendment privilege.
195. FED. R. EVID. 609.
196. Id. 404(b).
197. The accused would offend the principles of the privilege should he take the stand and
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gests, therefore, that this type of cross-examination is a dangerous en-
croachment on the fifth amendment privilege and cannot be justified by
society's demand for a fair and effective criminal.justice system.
198
In summary, the Court can no longer impair the accused's privilege
to refuse to answer incriminating questions on cross-examination under
the guise of a "waiver" theory. The accused's act of testifying does not
comport with the traditional requirements of a voluntary foregoing of a
known right or privilege. The inadequacy of the waiver theory suggests
the need for a new analysis of the constitutional limitations on the
cross-examination of the accused; an analysis that reflects the compet-
ing interests of the accused and society. This section of the comment
has suggested that the need of society to foster the function of the
courts to ascertain the truth does not outweigh the right of the individ-
ual to exercise his fifth amendment privilege to refrain from answering
questions that require incriminating responses to offenses other than
those to which the accused is charged and has testified.
The accused should, henceforthforfeit his fifth amendment privilege
when taking the stand and testifying only to those questions that tend
to incriminate the accused of the crime to which he is charged and has
testified to seek acquittal. 199 The accused should retain his right to
claim the privilege to all questions that pose a real danger of incrimi-
nating the accused of offenses to which he has not testified to seek ac-
quittal.2 00°  Evidentiary rules governing the proper scope of cross-
examination should no longer be the measure of the accused's privi-
lege.20' Questions that require incriminating responses to the crime to
which the accused has testified, although outside the proper scope of
perjure himself by falsely claiming his innocence of the other offenses. Nonetheless, the primary
purpose of bringing the accused to trial is to convict him of the charged crime, not other offenses.
The accused's ability to perjure himself concerning other offenses does not, therefore, greatly com-
promise the truth-finding function of the courts of justice.
198. See Note, Privilege of Criminal Defendants and Scope of Cross-Examination, 5 U. CHI. L.
REV. 116, 121-22, n.23 (1937). This principle is already recognized in the area of character evi-
dence used to impeach a witness' credibility. Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure states that the accused, or a witness, does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination
by testifying to matters affecting only the credibility of the witness. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b),
Advisory Comm. Note (b).
199. The accused also retains the privilege as to those counts of a rfiulti-count indictment to
which he has exercised his right to remain silent. Contra, People v. Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 621, 422
P.2d 597, 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912 (1967).
200. As to these types of questions, the accused is treated as an ordinary witness under Rogers
v. United States. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra. The accused's answer need not
amount to a confession of crime to be privileged, but need only provide a link in the chain of
evidence of guilt. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
The accused may be able to avoid the possibility of having to claim the privilege as to one or
more counts of a multi-count indictment or information to which he does not intend to testify by
filing a pretrial motion of severance pursuant to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. See Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See generally Comment,
Joinder of Counts as a Violation of an Accused's Right to Remain Silent, 41 TEmp. L.Q. 458 (1968).
201. This analysis necessarily requires overruling Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189
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direct examination, will not rise to the level of a violation of the ac-
cused's constitutional privilege. They are violations of purely eviden-
tiary rules and should be treated as non-constitutional error.20 2
The prosecution must not be permitted to ask questions of the ac-
cused merely to force him to assert his privilege.20 3 An area of inquiry
that will obviously compel the proper assertion of the accused's privi-
lege, because of the accused's assertion of the privilege to similar ques-
tions, must be off limits from prosectuion cross-examination. 204
Failure to honor this restriction should require sanctions and in ex-
treme cases reversal for prosecution misconduct.
Finally, the government must be able to comment on the accused's
failure to testify to facts reasonably within the accused's knowledge and
not falling within the accused's remaining privilege. The privilege re-
mains intact as to questions directed to unresolved offenses to which
the accused has not testified and may not be impaired by prosecution
comment.2 o5
CONCLUSION
Commentators have begun to scrutinize the broad construction of
"waivers" of constitutional rights to limit the protection afforded by
these rights.20 6 These commentators suggest that some of the intrusions
of constitutional rights that pass as "waivers" do not, in fact, comport
with the traditional definition of waivers of constitutional rights.207
This comment has re-examined the appropriateness of defining an ac-
cused's affirmative act of taking the stand and testifying as a waiver of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This inquiry
has become especially important by virtue of the deficiencies of the
measure of the scope of the waiver of the accused's privilege. The con-
fusion surrounding the United States Supreme Court's definition of
(1943) and Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912). Brown v. United States, 340 U.S. 148
(1958), is of questionable validity.
For criticism of the use of the rules of cross-examination as a measure of the accused's waiver,
see McCoRMICK, supra, note 21, §132; Comment, Speak No Evil- The Impact fRule 611(b) on the
Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 842 (1979).
202. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
203. The accused has the option of seeking a ruling, before he testifies, on the permissibility of
certain areas of questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-339 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
204. See 582 F.2d at 908 (negative inference).
205. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943).
206. See Wessen,Away From Waiver: 4 Rationale For the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1214 (1976-77); Comment, Speak No Evil- The Impact of
Rule 611(b) on the Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 842, 849-51
(1979).
207. See note 206 supra.
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"relevant cross-examination" has deprived the accused of the ability to
anticipate and determine the scope of his waiver.20 8 Even the federal
rule of cross-examination, if consistently applied by the Court, would
leave the accused with an ambiguous measure of his privilege and a
severely diluted constitutional right.2 9
This comment has demonstrated that the accused's act of testifying
in his own behalf cannot be construed as a waiver. The accused is un-
able to make a knowing waiver of the privilege because he is unable to
ascertain the scope of his waiver2"' and because the accused does not
voluntarily answer prosecution questions capable of eliciting incrimi-
nating responses.21'
If the accused is to be denied the protections of the privilege by tak-
ing the stand and testifying, the Court must base this denial upon a
forfeiture of the privilege. The Court must demonstrate that the need
of society to further the function of the courts to ascertain the truth
outweighs the individual's right to exercise the fifth amendment privi-
lege to refuse answering incriminating questions on cross-examination
unburdened by the decision of whether to exercise his right to testify to
his innocence. This comment has suggested that the Court is justified
in enforcing a forfeiture of the fifth amendment privilege to refuse to
answer only those questions that tend to incriminate the accused of the
crime with which he is charged and to which he has taken the stand
and testified. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is impaired by compelling the accused to answer cross-examination
questions that would tend to incriminate the accused of offenses to
which he has not taken the stand to testify in an effort to avoid
conviction.
The proposal offered by this author is a compromise of the compet-
ing interests of society and the individual. The proposal offers certainty
and a partial retention of the privilege to the accused. The proposal
offers society the freedom to subject that part of the accused's testimony
that bears directly on the crime with which he is charged and has testi-
fied to the exacting test of government cross-examination. The present
rule offers only confusion to the accused and the government, endless
208. See notes 87-111 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 112-116 and accompanying text supra.
210. See notes 87-116 and accompanying text supra.
211. See notes 123-137 and accompanying text supra.
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relitigation on appeal of the accused's claim of violations of his fifth
amendment privilege, and drastic impairment of the accused's
privilege.
David S. Adelstein
